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We analyze various normatively determined distributions of language rights in multilingual 
settings. A general model for the analysis of language rights over time in a model with 
overlapping generations is set up. This model is then first used to find efficient allocations of 
rights in the tradition of Wicksell. It is shown that, when rights today influence the status of a 
language in the future, the “naïve” static analysis has to be augmented in favor of further-
reaching minority rights in order to take into account the dynamic aspect. It is then 
demonstrated that a traditional welfare-economic analysis generally goes even further in the 
support of minority rights. If a possible externality on other communities is taken into 
account, however, these results are reversed in a pure efficiency analysis. If redistribution 
arguments are taken into account, this provides an effect in the opposite direction again. 
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1 Introduction
Language is certainly the most important means of communication in all human societies. At the same
time, language is one of the most important aspects of an individual's personality, as well as of its social
and cultural identity. These two aspects of language often nd themselves in conict with one another.
On the one hand, network externality properties of the communication aspect implies that the greater is
the number of speakers of a certain language, the more useful is that language in communication and in
the limit it would be ecient to have only one single language for communication purposes.
Balancing this tendency is the desire of many individuals to preserve their language as a marker of
identity. In a static perspective, language, like talents and other personal characteristics, can be seen
as part of the denition, or initial endowment, of the individual. In a dynamic setting, however, the
situation is slightly more complex. Firstly, we have to distinguish between dynamics within a generation
and between generations. Of course, an individual can over its lifespan change its language, or acquire
additional idioms. However, the more drastic changes occur between generations, where a language shift
often happens over three consecutive generations: the members of one generation are unilingual in one
language, their children grow up bilingual and their grandchildren unilingual in the second language.
The survival of a language, its implantation in the next generation, depends on many factors, one
of which is the status of the language in society. This status is inuenced by, among other things, the
possibilities to use the language in various social areas, domains.
Whether a language receives an ocial status in any specic domain or not, is very often a political
issue, and it is an instrument that can be used by those in power { be it a dominant majority or a
political elite { to control and exploit those who are weak, whether they are underprivileged masses or
ethnic minorities or both. An analysis of these aspects is closely related to rent-seeking and political,
social and economic power. These are questions analyzed in positive economics.
One can also, however, look at the problem from a constitutional or normative perspective. One
may look for acceptable allocations of rights according to some ethics criterion. The choice of rights for
minorities can, for instance, be realized in a decentralized Wicksellian system based on the equivalence
principle, where only (potential) Pareto improvements on some initial situation are to be realized within
the community, or the desired allocation of rights may be governed by some other normative principles,
such as the maximization of a (paternalistic) welfare function. These principles may or may not consider
the eects on other external communities.
In this essay the dynamic impact of assigning rights to certain languages is tied together with the
Wicksellian view of an optimal allocation and contrasted with a more welfare-oriented approach. We set
up a formal dynamic model of language evolution in section 2 and then specify this model in section 3 in
order to analyze rst the equivalence-principle approach in section 3.1. Then in section 3.2 it is shown
that this approach causes negative externalities outside the ethnic community. Finally, in section 4, it is
demonstrated that in a paternalistic model of justice these externalities have to be relativized.
1.1 Language and the allocation of rights
One can distinguish between various characteristics of the goods enjoyed by the individuals in a society.
The actual use of a language is an individual matter, giving benets to the individual using it.1 Whether
1Of course, one person's use of a language might very well aect the well-being of the person it is talking to, or might
want to communicate with, producing an externality, be it positive or negative. The larger is the number of speakers of a
language, the greater is the potential number of contacts and, hence, the benet of the language to a person knowing it.
2a person chooses to use a certain language or not in a given situation, will to a large extent depend upon
the constraints it is facing. One important constraint is, of course, whether one is understood or not and
manages to communicate. This can partially be determined by legal rights, forcing, for instance, public
oces to accept the use of certain languages in doing ocial business. Ignoring associated costs, such
rights to communication in a certain language can in principle be made available to all individuals to the
same extent. Unlike many other rights, like the right to smoke in public places versus the right to enjoy
fresh air at the same location, the right to use a certain language in a given setting is a non-exclusive
right that does not per se exclude the right to use another language in the same setting: My right to
communicate with (and get answers from) a public oce in Bislama, say, does not infringe on your right
to use Volap uk in doing your business with the same oce.
Considering the costs of implementing a right, we note that in the dependency on the number of
beneciaries all possible degrees of economies of scale can occur. Having street signs in a certain language,
involves only xed costs, whereas the provision of elementary education is more or less proportional to
the number of beneciaries.
Here we are focusing on these legal rights and not on all the other possibilities to use a language
outside the public sector. The latter possibilities are, of course, determined primarily by the number of
speakers, but also by other factors, such as the domain in which a certain interaction takes place. In
a comprehensive analysis of language rights and justice also these aspects would have to be taken into
account.2 In this essay, however, we limit the analysis to formal legal rights.
2 The basic model
2.1 Notation
Society at time t is made of a set Nt of all individuals born into society at time t as well as the set Nt 1
of all individuals born at time t 1. That is, the set of individuals alive in period t is given by Nt[Nt 1.
In other words, an individual lives two periods. At birth it is socialized into a certain language l, where
the set of all languages under consideration is denoted by L.3 The number of individuals of cohort t
in language group l, that is the number of individuals born in period t into group l, is written as nl0
t .
Since individuals live for two periods, the number of older individuals alive at time t is nl0
t 1. This is also
denoted by nl1






Let the set of legally dened domains be D. The set of rights in eect at time t is a matrix rt of
zeroes and ones. The right to use language l in domain d in period t is then written as rld
t = 1 and the
denial of that right as rld
t = 0. The propensity of individual i to pay for a certain allocation of rights, r,
is written as bi (r).
This propensity to pay is, of course, only well dened in relation to a status quo. That is, we normalize
the propensities to pay to be equal to zero at the status quo. Two polar choices are  r = O, all rld are
zero, and  r = I, all rld are equal to one. The rst case means that our benchmark is that there are no
This network externality is central in the analysis of the long-term dynamics and equilibria of language usage as a means
of communication. This is analyzed by, among others, Selten and Pool (1991), Church and King (1993), as well as G uth,
Strobel, and Wickstr om (1997), who look at the benets of learning other languages in addition to the mother tongue,
and Wickstr om (2005), where the possibilities of the survival of communities of native speakers are analyzed. The present
analysis treats this property of language usage as part of the set of the exogenous constraints facing the individual and is,
hence, a possible factor inuencing its propensity to pay for a certain language right.
2For more general analyses in this direction, the reader is referred to, for instance, Kymlicka and Patten (2003) and the
references therein. For a more formal analysis, see also Parijs (2002), as well as the contribution of the same author in
Kymlicka and Patten (2003).
3For the purpose of this essay, we ignore the fact that individuals can belong to several language groups at the same
time. The assumption that each individual is associated with one language simplies the notational problems considerably
and does not detract from the principal points of the analysis.
3rights at all in eect and the second signies that the benchmark is the existence of all possible rights in
all domains for all languages.
Intuitively, one can say that, in the rst case, we are born without any individual rights, and all rights
have to be bought from society. In the second case, we are all born with all possible rights, and the
negation of any right has to be bought from the beneciaries of that right by the rest of society.4 For the
purpose of this essay, we will assume the former, that is bi (O) is set equal to 0 for all i. The right to be
able to use a certain language in a certain situation can for our purposes be looked upon as a non-rival
good. The \demand" or propensity to pay for this good will vary over the individuals. The sum of all
individuals' propensities to pay will then give society's total propensity to pay for this specic right. A
dierence from the text-book case is that the rights are not continuous, but discrete non-rival goods. Of
course, the individual propensity to pay will depend (directly or indirectly) on a number of exogenous
factors such as income and prices, but also the availability of other language rights will enter the demand
for any specic right to use a certain language.5
Let c(r;n) be the costs to society that the realization of the rights allocation r causes. Again, this
can only be sensibly dened in relation to the status quo. The costs will depend on a number of factors in
addition to r. Especially, the number of individuals making use of the right is important. The function
c is assumed to be concave in nl if rld = 1 for some d.6
2.2 Dynamic structure
It is reasonable to assume that the rights conveyed on speakers of language l in eect at period t inuence
the status of that language in that period and, hence, the choice of language of the next generation, that
is the size of nl0
t+1.7 That is, we assume, that the parents, when they bring up their children, decide on
socializing them into their own language or another (majority) language depending on the status of the
own language compared to the alternative language(s) { the emotional, cultural aspect { as well as on
the number of speakers { the practical, communication aspect. Hence, the distribution of the individuals
on the dierent language groups, as well as the rights given to the speakers of the various languages will
determine the size of the groups in the next cohort. That is, the distribution of the next cohort on the























t :=  rmd
t   rmd
t = 0 for m 6= l
rld













4For a further discussion of the choice of status quo the reader is referred to Wickstr om (2007), for instance.
5The latter point can be partially operationalized as the \linguistic distance" between the languages. See, for instance,
the analysis in Ginsburgh, Ortu~ no-Ort n, and Weber (2005) or Fidrmuc, Ginsburgh, and Weber (2005). These authors
use such a distance as a measure of disenfranchisement. However, the propensity to pay will in general depend on other
factors, as well. Especially the emotional attachment to the language seems to be important. Compare, for instance, the
situation in Wales, where virtually every Welch-speaker is bilingual in English, too { see, for instance, the statistics in Grin
(1992) { or in the Basque country, where almost all speakers of Basque are bilingual in French or Spanish. Nevertheless,
the propensity to pay for an ocial status of the respective language seems to be considerable among its speakers.
6For dierent assumptions on this function, see Wickstr om (2007).
7The long-run eects of certain allocation of language rights would be part of the \emotional" aspect in determining the
propensities to pay. The designation of certain languages as \ocial" in given domains gives them a higher status, which
reduces the incentives of following generations to use the non-ocial ones, reducing the number of their speakers. This can
also lead to a situation of diglossia where the domains of the ocial language are constantly extended at the expense of
non-ocial languages. This, in turn, would give the speakers of the ocial language a head start in life. In the long run, it
might even lead to the death of non-ocial languages. For a further discussion of this possibility, see Wickstr om (2005).
4where n0
t is the vector of all nl0










By setting _ nl0
t+1 = 0 for all l, we nd a (in general) dierent steady state distribution of the language
groups for any given allocation of rights in society:




rmd :=  rmd   rmd = 0 if m 6= l
rld
t  0 for all d
rld = 1 for some d
. (2.4)
This dynamic structure is a crucial assumption of the model.
2.3 Eciency
In analyzing the ecient allocation of rights, we look for Pareto eciency. This can easily be realized
applying the compensated-variation criterion.
Let N be the relevant set of individuals and suppress the time index. The aggregated propensity in





This would have to be compared to the costs to society of providing these rights. The change in
language rights from the status quo,  r, to r is an improvement according to the compensated-variation
criterion if X
i2N
bi (r) > c(r). (2.6)
By introducing compensation payments (or taxes), i, we can formulate this slightly dierently. The
sum of the compensation payments covers the costs of introducing the rights { the introduction is feasible













The net benet to individual i of the allocation of rights r in comparison to the status quo is given by
ai  
r;i
:= bi (r)   i. (2.8)
The necessary requirement that this allocation be a feasible (strong) Pareto improvement, is then that
all a be positive, that is, that  be in the set dened by
P (r) :=








A necessary and sucient condition for the set P (r) to be non-empty is that the set
E (r) :=
(












be non-empty. Clearly, P (r)  E (r) and the condition P (r) 6= ; is equivalent to condition 2.6. If
2.6 holds, we can always nd a set of compensation payments such that every individual experiences an
improvement on the status quo through the introduction of the allocation of rights r.
5The Pareto-ecient allocations can then be found by maximizing the sum of the net benets, denoted
by S, over all possible allocations of rights subject to the feasibility constraint 2.7:
max
r





and  2 F (r) (2.11)






bi (r)   c(r)
#
. (2.12)
Denote the set of r solving 2.11 by ^ R. If  r = 2 ^ R, then P (^ r) 6= ;, and the ecient allocation can also be
realized as a Pareto improvement on the status quo.
2.4 Rights, fairness and justice
The liberal theory of justice, also referred to as justice as fairness, basically takes the position that, in
making normative judgments, an individual should be able to abstract from its own position in society in
order to make decisions about just allocations of resources between all individuals. One should be able
to \move oneself into others' shoes". This way of thinking goes back at least as far as antiquity. In Plato
(1888, 1980) Socrates uses such an argument to justify to Crito why he would not be prepared to leave
Athens even in the face of imminent execution. In modern times, Rawls (1971) has become the standard
reference in the moral philosophy applied to the social sciences.
Fairness is usually dened as freedom from envy in combination with an ecient allocation of re-
sources.8 It is a well-known result, that fair allocations in many situations do not exist.9 In other cases,
one can also argue that the concept is not very relevant. If we are talking about exclusive rights, for
example, any allocation is envy-free, since all individuals have the same right. However, some individuals
might value the right more then others.10
In the case of non-exclusive rights, like the right to use a language of one's choice, this problem does
not arise with the same severity. Also here one could argue that the right to use a certain language in a
certain domain is the same for all and hence fair, just as the right to smoke in public places. However,
a more reasonable point of departure is also possible. One can, as noted in section 2.4.1 below, choose
a status quo where each individual has the same right in relation to a language of its choice and then
allow voluntary interchanges in the form of side payments for less rights. This would be in the spirit of
fairness. This choice of a status quo with equal rights in this sense, however, is a a priori political issue
independent of a strictly wertfrei analysis, and dierent choices have dierent implications.11
In this essay, we will take as our status quo the absence of all rights and as a rst-best optimum dene
compensation payments in P (r). A rst-best optimum is then realized under the condition that all the
externalities to be discussed in section 3 are accounted for.
The problem becomes interesting, however, when certain compensation payments are impossible,
restricting the feasible transfers to some politically-institutionally given set 	, P (r) \ 	 = ;. Here,
some kind of trade-o between dierent individuals has to be dened. Such a denition will always
be subjective and political, determined by the preferences of the policy-maker. This trade-o can be
formalized with the help of a welfare function.
8See, for instance, Foley (1967), Varian (1974), or Varian (1975).
9Compare, for instance, Varian (1974), Pazner and Schmeidler (1974), or Pazner (1977).
10Take as an example the right to smoke or the prohibition on smoking in a public place; both a smoker and a non-smoker
enjoy the same right in both instances; hence, in either case, neither of them has any reason to want to exchange their
societal position with the other one. Eciency considerations would tell us in this case which right assignment is the
ecient one, but the traditional fairness concept provides us with little guidance as to how to compensate the \loser" in
the ecient allocation of rights, that is, telling us what is a \good" allocation of rights (and other goods) in this case.
11This is discussed in some detail in Wickstr om (2007).
62.4.1 Eciency versus equality
In order to address the issue of justice, as already noted, we need some standard of comparison between
individuals. We will deal with the individual changes ai from the given status quo and then discuss the
criteria for the interpersonal comparison of these changes. The status quo is per denitionem just. This
is the basic axiom of our analysis of just distributions. Limiting the analysis to only one sector of society
{ the allocation of language rights { we are implicitly assuming that injustices in other parts of society
are of no consequence for the allocation of language rights.
Contrary to the analysis in section 2.3 it is now assumed that not all transfer payments are possible,
but are restricted to some (institutionally given) set 	 that denes the politically feasible payments.
That is, restriction 2.7 is now replaced by
 2 	 \ F (r). (2.13)
It is assumed that the vector of zeroes { no transfer payments { is in the set 	. Then, clearly, 0 2 	\F (r)
and, by denition, ai ( r;0) = 0.
The welfare function needed to analyze the comparison over individuals, is dened to be a function
of the a's, W (a). Under the assumption that 	 \ F (r) is non-empty the maximization problem then
becomes:
max
r W (a) such that  2 	 \ F (r) (2.14)





























such that  2 	 \ F (r). (2.17)




is the policy variable of the planner determining the degree of inequality aversion,
giving dierent weights to the individuals according to their net gains. If the planner is not concerned
about distributional issues, all 
 
ai
are constant and identical, 
 
ai
= , and the maximization







such that  2 	 \ F (r) (2.18)






bi (r)   c(r)
#
(2.19)
If all weight is given to the person with the lowest gain (or largest loss), the case of extremely








such that  2 	 \ F (r) (2.20)
The planner will minimize the loss of the biggest loser. In general, there is a trade-o between eciency
and equality and the choice of the function  (a) determines the amount of trade-o that is deemed
(politically) acceptable.
73 The ecient allocation of language rights
We will illustrate the analytical framework above with the aid of a simple example. In spite of its
simplicity, the example suces for our purposes in this essay which is to address the dynamic issue of
rights allocation. We limit ourselves to two languages and two language groups, A and B. An individual
i belongs to either group. Group A is the majority and B the minority, and we analyze the eciency of
providing full rights to the minority language in any of the domains D, denoted by rBd = 1, if the right
is granted, and rBd = 0, if it is not. Assuming \selsh" preferences, we let the propensity to pay for such














The function c is assumed to be concave in nB.12 Let














biBd   cBd  
nB
 0. (3.4)
We can rewrite this condition as







nB  0, (3.6)
where bBd is the average propensity of the B individuals to pay for the right.
We can now order the domains according to the size of SBd with the highest value for d = 1 and
successively lower (or same) value for increasing values of d. There will then be a critical value d such
that, for all d  d, SBd  0 and, for all d > d, SBd < 0. That is, it is ecient to introduce rights for
language B in domains 1, 2, ...., d and not in domains d + 1, d + 2, ... , D.13
Since an individual is alive for two periods and the generations overlap, the problem is slightly more
complex, however. In period t there will be both young and old individuals in the two groups. The size


















t . Correspondingly, we denote the propensities to pay for individuals alive in period t by
bi0
t and bi1








































12For dierent assumptions on this function, see Wickstr om (2007).
13We are implicitly assuming that there is at least one domain, in which it is inecient to introduce the right. Else, our
problem becomes trivial.
8The total discounted aggregated net propensity to pay for realizing the right in domain d at time t = 0
can be decomposed into three eects. There is the one obvious direct eect and two indirect eects due
to the fact that the future nB changes and that the future rB also might change as a consequence. The





















































































































The analysis of the problem of nding an optimal allocation of rights, that is nding a sequence of rB
t
that is ecient, can be divided into several cases. We can see it from the point of view of all { present
and future { B individuals or from the point of view of only the B individuals alive in period t. We can
also consider the eect on the A individuals, that is possible external eects due to the introduction of
rights for language B.
3.1 Group-internal considerations
If only the interests of the group are taken into consideration, there are two basic views to consider.
Either only the individuals alive at a certain time are to be counted in the decisions. This can be seen
as close to a constitutional-economics analysis and is in the tradition of the equivalence principle. It is
not unreasonable to assume that individuals will seek institutional set-ups leading to ecient allocations.
This is the question asked in constitutional economics and it has its roots in the work of Wicksell. A
more normative point of view takes also unborn generations into account. We will see that the results
then can dier from the more egocentric view.
3.1.1 Cohort-centered analysis
The total aggregated propensity to pay for the right for language B in domain d at time t and t + 1 of
the individuals living at time t, that is the gross benet to the individuals alive at time t of the right





































from the latter costs, however, in order to get the compensated variation, the propensities to pay of the
next generation alive in period t + 1 have to be subtracted. From the point of view of the individuals
14Because of the discrete changes in nB
t+1, this, of course, is a rst-order approximation of the eect. However, higher-order
eects cannot change the qualitative conclusions.






































In comparison to the static case, we have a second and third term due to the increase in nB
t+1 because of
the increased status of language B caused by granting it the right in domain d in period t. We need to









We note that ^ D is not necessarily unique, since dnB
t+1 is a function of the whole vector rB
t+1 (not only
of rBd









That is, using the static criterion, we have that d 2 D
t is equivalent to setting rBd
t = 1. Due to
the concavity of c, we see that nB
t+1 > nB
t implies that D
t  D
t+1 and, hence, dr
B
t+1  0 for all .
Since the term after the minus sign in the square brackets of the third term of 3.11 is negative due to
the concavity of c in n, the application of the static criterion to expression 3.11 implies that dSB
t  0
and that D
t  ^ Dt. It is readily seen that it in general is a proper subset, since for small values of 
the second and third terms will be strictly positive, allowing the rst term to become negative without
violating the dynamic criterion.
We can then conclude that the static criterion for introducing language rights is too restrictive, and,
due to the dynamic structure of the problem, minority rights should go further than a simple static
analysis indicates.
3.1.2 Intergenerational eciency
The net future benets are given by expression 3.8. In comparison to the analysis in section 3.1, we see
that the correction due to the intertemporal structure has increased, since the change in the number of
individuals in the B group not only increases in the period after the introduction of the right, but, of
course, continues to be bigger than in the alternative scenario { no right in period t { due to the dynamic
structure dened in expression 2.2.
3.1.3 Steady state
We can also compare the steady states of intergenerational eciency with and without a certain right in
eect. To simplify things, we consider the situation with and without a right d. All rights in the sets
f1;:::;d   1g and fd + 1;:::;Dg are assumed to be unaected by the decision on d. Further, let nB (0) be
the steady-state size of the B community without right d in eect and correspondingly nB (1) if right d
is in eect. The criterion for keeping right d if it has been in eect is then dSB (1)  0 with































10and the criterion for not introducing right d if it has not been in eect is dSB (0) < 0 with































Since dnB (1)and dnB (0) could be assumed to be arbitrarily small and nB (1) > nB (0), it is clear
that the situation
dSB (1) > 0 > dSB (0) (3.16)
is not unreasonable, making both allocations of rights ecient in the long run. In other words, the
problem of nding an intergenerationally ecient allocation of rights is path-dependent. The analysis of
the case of the cohort-centered analysis is, of course, totally parallel.
3.1.4 Discussion
The simple analysis in this section has demonstrated that the naive static criterion for determining the
compensated variation of the introduction of language rights tends to underestimate the net benets of
the rights to the speech community. What our analysis tells us, is that a static analysis of the net benets
will lead to a too small set of realized rights, since the status eect on the language of the introduction
of the right would not be suciently accounted for. In nuce, it is ecient from the point of view of a
language community to introduce rights that go beyond the instantaneous cost-benet calculations.
3.2 Global considerations
In addition to the eects analyzed above, there is also an eect on the A group. If a right is introduced
in period t and, as a consequence, the B group increases by dnB
t+1 in the subsequent period, then, by
constant cohort size, the size of the next A generation, nA
t+1, will decrease by dnB
t+1 and the aggregated
propensity to pay for the right of language A in the next generation will also decrease. In the cost-benet
calculus in the cohort-centered analysis, the young individuals in period t will hence suer a loss in period




















































































Since ex hypothesi nB
t+1 < nA
t+1 and c is concave in n the change to the A community is negative, and
the consideration of the externality implies a reduction in the number of rights put in eect in the B
11community. Indeed, dSA
t is bigger in absolute value than the third term of dSB
t and, since more
rights are in eect for the A group, it can be considerably so. Hence, the use of the static criterion does
not imply that dSt > 0. That is, what is ecient according to the static criterion, is not necessarily
ecient if the externality is taken into account. We, hence, would have to reverse the conclusions in the
previous section. It can be ecient to introduce less minority rights than what a simple static analysis
would imply. We can nd an \ecient discrimination" of minorities.
4 Welfare-optimal allocations of rights
Returning to the problem in section 3.2, we now modify the eciency analysis and introduce the welfare
function from section 2.4.1. Firstly, we look at the problem when the costs of the rights are carried by
the respective communities. Within the community everyone pays the same tax. Then, we analyze the
situation when the costs are equally divided among all individuals in both communities.
4.1 Intracommunity cost-sharing













































































































































































































12If the planner wants to redistribute in favor of the losers, the 's will be negatively correlated with the
b's and V ld will be negative.
The introduction of the right for speakers of language B in domain d at time t  0 will aect the























We rst have the direct eect on the B community, dSB
t , and the externality on the A community,
dSA
t , due to the change in nB
t from time t = 1. This is the same phenomenon as analyzed in section
3.2 above.16 Given that nA > nB and that rights are realized in all domains for the members of the B
community, we readily see that for any two individuals i 2 NA and j 2 NB, if bAdi
t = b
Bdj



















A planner, wanting to redistribute in favor of the weaker individuals, will, hence, give higher weight
to individual i than to individual j. If the distributions of the propensities to pay b are similarly dis-
tributed among the individuals in the two communities, then as a consequence B
t > A
t and the negative
externality on the A community will have a lower weight than in the corresponding eciency problem
in section 3.2. This signies that the term dSB
t can take on lower values than in the eciency case
without making the change in welfare negative. That is, rights in more domains become acceptable in
the paternalistic welfare analysis.
However, we have a negative eect due to the dispersion measure V . Since the planner wants to
redistribute in favor of the losers, more weight will be given to the individuals with low values of b the
consideration of the right becoming eective in the new domain, which will tend to reduce the change in
welfare and, hence, the likelihood of introducing the right.
Finally, there is the intertemporal eect of the introduction of the right causing an increase in nB.
This will not only aect the costs, which is already taken into account in dSA
t and dSB
t , but also the
heterogeneity measures within the two communities, negatively due to V B and positively due to V A.




t for all i
and d, then V A and V B are all equal to zero and the result is clear: By giving more weight to the
relative losers, it is desirable to give more rights to the minority language, than what comes out of a pure
eciency analysis.
4.2 Universal cost-sharing
We now assume that the costs of the rights must be distributed equally among all individuals, that is:
	 =

ji = j;8i;j 2 N
	
(4.9)




























15We are implicitly assuming that the changes in the weights  and the dispersion measure V due to the introduction of
a new (marginal) right are negligible.
16The dierence is only that we are now looking at the eect on all future generations, whereas in section 3.2 we limited
the analysis to the individuals alive at time t = 0. The present analysis could easily be limited to the cohort-centered case,
which would have no consequence for the qualitative results.






















































































































































We see that the welfare measure consists of several components, the well-being of the A community,







. We will look at the scal externality in more detail in the following.




















































































































































































We have assumed that no other right is changed as a consequence of the introduction of the right in
domain d: dr
B
t = 0 for  6= d. Again, the change in welfare is determined by three eects, a direct
externality on the A community, which is negative with weight A, a direct eect on the B community,
with weight B, as well as several scal externalities. Hence, in addition to the case in section 4.1 we
have the scal externalities. The rst one is the obvious direct one; the A community contributes to the
nancing of the implementation of the right in domain d in the B community; an advantage for the B
community and a clear disadvantage for the A community.
The second scal externality depends on the dynamic structure and has two components. Firstly,
because of the increase in the size of the B community and the corresponding decrease in the size of the
A community, a larger share of the public budget falls on the B community compared to the eciency
case in section 3.2. Secondly, the costs of implementing all rights decrease in the A community, but
increase per capita due to the convexity of the cost functions. Similarly, the implementation costs of the
rights in the B community increase, but decrease per capita. Of course these scal externalities work
in opposite directions in the two communities, which is reected in the signs of the weights. The net
eect is unclear and depends on the elasticities of the cost functions. If only xed costs are encountered,
the elasticities are zero and the eect is a negative one for the B community. If the cost functions are
linear, the elasticities are equal to one, and the eect is a positive one for the B community, since, by
assumption, nB
t =n < 1=2.
Intuitively, in rst case the costs in the A community do not change, but the number of individuals
decreases, and some of the costs are therefore shifted to the B community which increases in size. In the
second case both the number of individuals and the costs in the A community decrease proportionally and
correspondingly increase proportionally in the B community. Since the A community is bigger than the
B group, the relief in the tax share of the B people due to the reduction in the costs of the implemented
rights in the A community is greater than the increase due to the increase in the size of the B community.
The contribution from the A community to the nancing of the rights in the B community will then, by
the corresponding argument, increase, since the size of the A community is greater than that of the B
group.
In comparison to the analysis in section 4.1 we see that the direct scal externality adds a further
argument in favor of more rights for the minority, whereas the indirect scal externality via the dynamic
eect in some cases relativizes this eect.
5 Concluding remarks
In this essay we have tried to examine systematically the factors inuencing the normative arguments for
the allocation of language rights to a linguistic minority from an economic point of view. We have seen
that a simple static cost-benet analysis has to be augmented in various directions. If there are dynamic
implications of the rights assignment, strengthening the minority numerically, this brings an argument in
favor of more rights for the minority. However, such a dynamic eect creates a negative externality for the
majority, which more than compensates for the positive eect on the minority, delivering an argument for
an optimal discrimination of the minority. If we leave the simple cost-benet paradigm and introduce a
redistributive policy in favor of the losers in society, these conclusions again have to be modied and there
are arguments for giving less weight to the externality on the majority due to the dynamic structure.
These positive eects on the minority are further strengthened in the presence of a scal externality on
the minority, which will be compensated through more rights than in the previous case.
15The scope of the study has been limited to rights in formal domains which can be regulated by legal
means. The larger { and probably more important { issue of how to deal with linguistic discrimination in
the market place, has been totally ignored. Also the question what constitutes a legitimate minority, is not
the topic of this essay. Should recent immigrants be treated dierently from minorities, whose ancestors
have lived in a territory for numerous generations, often much longer than the majority population? A
related question is: When does a newly arrived group become the legitimate majority in a territory and
left-over members of the old majority a \normal" minority? This opens up many interesting, contradictory
and important questions, which can be approached and partially resolved by economic methodology.
These are, however, the topics left for future essays.
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